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ities of governments worldwide. The EU is not an exception in this context, given its
rapidly developing cyber security policy. Since the 1990s, we could observe the
creation of three broad areas of policy interest: cyber-crime, critical information
infrastructures and cyber-defence. One of the main trends transversal to these areas is
the importance that the private sector has come to assume within them. In particular in
the area of critical information infrastructure protection, the private sector is seen as a
key stakeholder, given that it currently operates most infrastructures in this area. As a
result of this operative capacity, the private sector has come to be understood as the
expert in network and information systems security, whose knowledge is crucial for the
regulation of the field. Adopting a Regulatory Capitalism framework, complemented
by insights from Network Governance, we can identify the shifting role of the private
sector in this field from one of a victim in need of protection in the first phase, to a
commercial actor bearing responsibility for ensuring network resilience in the second,
to an active policy shaper in the third, participating in the regulation of NIS by
providing technical expertise. By drawing insights from the above-mentioned frame-
works, we can better understand how private actors are involved in shaping regulatory
responses, as well as why they have been incorporated into these regulatory networks.
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Introduction
Despite being one of the most recent fields of European Union (EU) governance,
Network and Information Security (NIS) has also become one of its key priorities. NIS,
briefly put, ensures the security of computer networks operating within critical infra-
structures such as waste management systems and electricity grids, and the data they
contain, through ensuring the resilience of those systems to attacks. The protection of
networks and information systems has become essential in a society that is as connected
and as dependent on technology as the European one – indeed, the European Com-
mission considers the Internet and digital communications to be Bthe backbone^ of
social and economic prosperity, with NIS being the armour preventing it from breaking
(Commission, 2014). The recent examples of cyber attacks on the Janet Computer
Network (December 2015) and TalkTalk (October 2015) are representative of the
challenges posed to operators of Internet-based services, now generally understood
by the EU to constitute a form of Critical Information Infrastructure (CII). In the case of
the Janet Computer Network attack, British academic institutions found their internal
and external network access brought down by a concerted Distributed Denial of Service
attack, making university network servers inaccessible [1]. In the case of TalkTalk, an
Internet Service Provider offering high-speed broadband Internet access, its servers
were not only attacked, making websites slow to respond, but a significant volume of
consumer data, including unencrypted personal information, was also accessed and
allegedly shared online [2]. The cost of this intrusion, according to some estimates,
could reach as high as £60 million, and has resulted in the loss of 100,000 subscribers
[3]. Given that approximately 78 % of EU citizens actively use the Internet [69], the
breakdown of Internet communications presents significant economic costs, and the
unauthorised access to personal data may pose both economic and social costs,
including loss of confidence in the security of online transactions [4]. Yet, given that
these infrastructures, whether in the form of Internet access providers such as Virgin
Media or the Spanish Telefónica S.A. or online service providers such as eBay, Google
or Facebook (see [5] for more on this distinction), known collectively as Internet
service providers, are privately operated, how best to ensure their security? The
dominant view, at least in the EU, is that this is best achieved by bringing in the
technical knowledge and expertise of the private actors themselves; after all, who better
to identify the challenges that market operators face than those market operators
themselves? Within the context of liberalisation and privatisation, as the State has
stepped back from the provision of goods and services, the private sector has filled this
ostensible gap, and is perceived as being best placed to identify and respond to
regulatory challenges.
The present article aims to contribute to the topic of this special issue on how private
actors, working in non-private military and security fields, are participating in security
governance, by exploring the case study of Internet service providers. As mentioned in
the editorial (Bures and Carrapico, this issue), there is a clear gap in the literature in
terms of exploring the function and the extent to which private companies, whose main
activity is not related to security, are involved in security governance. The present
article wishes to contribute to reducing such gap by asking how Internet service
providers have been incorporated into and have contributed to shaping the governance
of Network and Information Security in the EU. The article argues that Regulatory
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Capitalism and Network Governance frameworks can contribute to answering this
research question by bringing to light how current economic theories based on
liberalisation and privatisation have led to the normalisation of a rationale according
to which the private sector should be further involved in the regulatory process, as it is
associated, not only to a higher degree of efficiency, but also to a greater level of
expertise and knowledge. Such a rationale has resulted in the delegation of regulatory
functions to independent bodies, as well as the transfer of the provision of goods and
services to the private sector. However, this article argues that there has been a further
important shift that has led the private sector working in the area of NIS- related critical
information infrastructures to evolve along the following three stages: 1) Private actor h
as a passive role as object of regulation; 2) Private actor becomes responsible for
adopting regulation; 3) Private actor becomes an active participant in the shaping of
that regulation (please see Tables 1 and 2 for further detail).
The authors propose to pursue this argument by, firstly, undertaking documentary
analysis to uncover how the role of the private sector is being framed in the area of NIS,
and, secondly, by using process tracing to map the evolution of the private sector role
along the above-mentioned three stages and identify key turning points.1 The article
starts by discussing the theoretical frameworks of Regulatory Capitalism and of Net-
work Governance, which it then uses to guide us through the evolution of public- private
relations in NIS. This evolution is the object of analysis in the second section of the
article, which uses the above-mentioned NIS 3 stage approach to understand how
private actors in this field have shifted from being framed as victims in need of
protection to being considered as actors responsible for adopting regulation, and in a
final stage to being seen as participating in the shaping of such regulation. In order to
further clarify the dynamics at play within this last stage, the third section focuses on the
specific case study of the Telecoms Package and how private actors in NIS have become
actively involved in shaping regulatory standards. The final section of the article
explores how this governance trend has become further accentuated with an expansion
of the role of private actors and of the definition of critical information infrastructures.
Conceptualising the role of private actors in network and information
security regulation
As mentioned in the introduction, the article seeks to understand the growing role of the
private sector within Network and Information Security (NIS) and its increased influ-
ence as policy-shapers, reconceptualised through the lenses of Regulatory Capitalism
[6, 12, 13] and of Network Governance [14]. Regulatory Capitalism provides a general
framework for understanding the current forms of governance in NIS, by highlighting
1 We use process tracing here in an interpretive sense; not as a means of identifying causal mechanisms that
explain outcomes [8, 9], but as a means of tracing the development of keys ideas and themes by analysing the
meanings that actors ascribe to their actions and policies ([10], p. 24). In the way that Schimmelfennig has
used process tracing methods to analyse the way that the conceptualisation and internalisation of liberal
democracy impacted upon the way in which enlargement decisions were taken by the former communist
Member States [11], this article seeks to understand how conceptualisations of how best to regulate and
internalised understandings of the expertise held by private sector actors then influences NIS-focused
regulatory decisions taken by the Commission.
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the increased role of the private sector in the State/ Private sector division of labour, and
by pointing out the resulting reliance on businesses’ expertise. Network Governance
complements Regulatory Capitalism by conceptualising the growing influence of the
private sector as policy shapers and by articulating the existing relations between public
and private actors (for more on Public Private partnerships see Bures, this edition, and
Bossong and Wagner, this edition).
When ‘neoliberal’ economic thought became a mainstream approach to economics
at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, Western governments quickly
moved in the direction of cuts to public spending and deregulation, underscored by a
belief that the private sector was best placed to achieve the market efficiencies that such
an understanding of economic activity entailed. For the purposes of this article, we
consider that Neoliberalism is a political economy theory that proposes that individuals’
interests are more efficiently achieved in a context of free markets, free trade, strong
private property rights and reduced State intervention [15]. Since the 1980s, efficient
governance has become intimately tied with privatisation and de-regulation [16]. As
argued by Vogel, however, the theory of Neoliberalism is rather different from the
practices of Neoliberalism (1996), which have also been described as ‘actually existing
neoliberalism’ [17, 18]. In fact, rather than the expected deregulation and retreat of the
state resulting from this paradigm shift, we have observed a reregulation process, which
Gilardi [13], Braithwaite [12] and Levi-Faur [6] have described as contrary to the
theory of neoliberalism; instead of markets becoming unregulated akin to a laissez-faire
approach to economic activity, regulatory bodies and ensuing regulations have in fact
proliferated [12, 19]. Given the exponential increase in non-State regulation, these
authors consider that we should, instead, refer to this process as Regulatory Capitalism.
In a rather neofunctionalist approach, in order for the free market to function
adequately and for privatisation processes to be implemented and overseen, the creation
of independent regulatory bodies was perceived as necessary [20]. The latter included
regulatory agencies, regulatory networks, and regulatory instruments, such as public-
Table 2 Adapted table on the transformation of governance and the nature of regulatory capitalism (source:
[6, 7])
Laissez Faire capitalism
(1800s–1930s)
Welfare capitalism
(1940s–1970s)
Regulatory
capitalism (1980s-)
Networked regulatory
capitalism
Steering Business State State and Agencies State, Agencies, Business
Rowing Business State Business Business
NIS Stages 0 0 1 and 2 3
Table 1 The transformation of governance and the nature of regulatory capitalism (source: [6])
Laissez Faire
capitalism (1800s- 1930s)
Welfare capitalism
(1940s- 1970s)
Regulatory capitalism (1980s-)
Steering Business State State and Agencies
Rowing Business State Business
NIS Stages 0 0 1 and 2
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private partnerships [12]. In a study by Braithwaite and Jordana (referred to in [12], p.
vii), which looks at 49 countries from 1920 to 2002, we can observe how the number of
regulatory agencies being created leaped from 5 per year between the 1960s and the
1980s, to 40 per year in the period between 1994 and 1996. Numerous examples can be
provided of this reregulation process. Where quality standardisation and certification is
concerned, for instance, most of the industry is now being regulated by international
standards. The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), an independent
non- governmental organisation, creates international standards for goods and services,
including things as different as toy safety, waste management, the work of private
security services, and critical infrastructure protection. The standards, which are defined
by technical committees comprised of industry bodies, research and testing organisa-
tions, local and central government, and consumers, are then voluntarily adopted by
industry and public bodies in an attempt to keep a competitive edge and boost their
reputation [21]. This global shift has led not only to radical changes in the way the State
engages with the economy, but also to a major transformation in the way the economy
itself is organised [13, 22]. In light of the article’s interest in how the private sector is
participating in security governance, it is important to discuss the role of regulatory
bodies in this reregulation process. As the empirical sections of the article will point
out, although the private sector is traditionally not included in the list of regulatory
bodies, it has gradually come to take part in the reregulation process, namely through
the encouragement of the State and of regulatory agencies.
As mentioned previously, the decision to create regulatory agencies, networks
and instruments is related to the perceived need to efficiently pursue a
liberalisation and privatisation agenda. The emergence of regulatory agencies is
intimately related to two elements: firstly, the State apparatus, which was under-
stood as too dependent on electoral results and varying political interests, was
considered to be too politically uncertain to serve as a solid base for economic
development [23]. In order to provide a more coherent and continuous approach,
which the markets could rely on, it was decided that efficiency could only be
achieved in an apolitical context by professional regulators [24]. Secondly, the
process of privatisation also led to public demand for regulation of the private
sector and its capacity to provide society with goods and services [7]. As a result,
regulatory bodies emerged as the ideal operational solution to regulate
liberalisation, in a way that is autonomous from the political system. Their main
functions are to collect and process information, as well as to produce efficient
solutions to practical regulatory problems [25, 26].
Although the degree of efficiency of Neoliberalism has often been questioned
[27–29], there is little doubt regarding the hegemonic character of its discourse, with
the consequent reregulation having become 1) the norm in most countries; and 2)
transversal to most sectors of the economy. As we will see throughout the article, the
efficiency of neoliberal discourse was particularly instrumental in the development of
new sectors, in particularly technology-intensive sectors such as the NIS, where private
actors’ input has been prioritised on the basis of their perceived expertise. As an-
nounced in the introduction, it allowed for private actors in the field of Network and
Information Security, namely Internet Service Providers, to evolve along three stages:
1) Passive role as object of regulation; 2) Actors responsible for adopting and
implementing regulation; 3) Active participants in the shaping of that regulation.
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Let us start by focusing on the first stage. As Table 1 indicates, Levi-Faur and
Braithwaite consider that the economic governance paradigm of the nineteenth century
and early twentieth century, which was based on private initiative or laissez-faire, was
replaced with the mid-twentieth century State-based regulatory model (named Welfare
Capitalism in Table 1). In the latter, the State is both responsible for organising the
economy (steering) and for providing citizens with a considerable amount of goods and
services (rowing). The role of the private actors in the second model is limited to areas
open to private initiative and competition. According to these authors, the Regulatory
Capitalism model (from the 1980s onwards) would be a further evolution, where the
State maintains the direction of the economy and oversight over the content of
produced regulations, delegating powers to independent agencies to implement and
enforce those regulations (steering), with the private sector being responsible for a
much larger provision of goods and services (rowing). The privatization of traditional
State sectors, such as the electric grid or the management of nuclear power plants are
good examples of Regulatory Capitalism model changes. This model corresponds to
both stages 1 and 2 of our analytical framework. In the first stage, the private sector
adopts a passive role as a ‘rower’ and as an object of regulation by the State and, in the
second stage, it becomes responsible for adopting regulation. Although still in the
context of a hierarchical relation, where the regulatory adoption has a mandatory
character, the private sector begins to emerge as a more active actor.
This re-emergence of the private sector in the regulatory process is interpreted by
Braithwaite [7], Bevir and Rhodes [30] and Castells [28] as transforming what used to
be, up until the 1970s/1980s, a single actor system of governance into a form of
network governance, characterized by the presence of multiple actors with different
functions being brought together (see also [31]). Although Regulatory Capitalism
authors make substantial references to the growing importance of the private sector,
the majority of this body of literature has two limitations: 1) it is mainly focused on
regulatory agencies and their geographical and multilevel diffusion [13, 32], and, more
importantly, 2) it depicts the private sector as subservient to State or agency regulation.
As a result, the role of industry is generally understood as limited to that of a provider
of goods and services that requests and implements regulation [7]. As the empirical
sections of this article will point out, however, there are sectors of activity, such as NIS,
where the private sector is not only rowing, but also steering.
On this basis, the present article aims to contribute to the Regulatory Capitalism
literature by proposing that the shift from a regulatory State to regulatory capitalism
paved the way for a greater presence of the private sector, not only as a service
provider, but also as an actor within the regulatory process itself, including through
self-regulation, and through participation in regulatory bodies. As such, the article
proposes a new phase to Levi-Faur’s conceptualisation of governance and its transfor-
mation. As can be seen in Table 2, the authors propose that a fourth phase be introduced
to reflect the private sectors’ current role in steering regulation. This arrangement
corresponds to stage 3 of our analytical framework, where the private sector is an
active participant in the shaping of regulation.
This is an idea that already features in the Network Governance literature [14] and
that more adequately represents the role of the private sector in the NIS field, an
understanding that can complement and expand the Regulatory Capitalism framework
as a way for conceptualising governance within the current economic system. Within
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this literature, Risse and Börzel [33] analysed current regulation as being the result of
four different relations between public and private entities: 1) ‘State-led regulation with
consultation of the private sector’; 2) ‘State delegation of powers to independent
agencies and bodies’; 3) ‘Co-regulation between the public and private sectors as equal
partners’; and 4) ‘Private self-regulation that is sanctioned by the State’. In the
remainder of the article, we will see that all these different relations between the public
and private sectors have existed at some stage within the European governance of NIS,
leading to an understanding of a much more active role of the private sector in the
production of regulation than that implied in Regulatory Capitalism. In fact, if we apply
the insights of the Network Governance literature to Braithwaite’s regulatory networks,
we can begin to identify what is actually a more hybrid form of governance [34, 35], in
which public-private relations are collaborative, rather than competitive. Network
Governance also provides some insights into the organisational rationale of these
regulatory networks, allowing us to understand how the private sector managed to
achieve such a key position within the production of regulation of NIS. The transna-
tional networks are not formed around formal power and institutional design, but rather
around technical knowledge and expertise. Control over the expertise is essential to the
capacity to exert control over the regulatory process [36]. As a result, depending on the
field, expertise could be located within different actors. Within the current economic
framework, ‘expertise’ is closely linked to business practice, based as it is in the belief
that private market actors are efficient and best placed to understand their regulatory
needs (see for example [37]).
As will be argued throughout the article, in the case of NIS, as in most emerging
areas, the State and independent regulatory agencies do not have adequate technical
knowledge to regulate this field. In order to protect critical information infrastructures, it
is considered necessary to be aware of the most recent cyber threats and how to
appropriately respond to them. Even if security is not the main business of a great deal
of information and technology companies, such as Internet service providers, they are
considered to be better placed to understand, and subsequently minimise the risks within
NIS [38]. When Regulatory Capitalism draws insight from Network Governance, it can
serve to better understand how private actors are involved in regulation of specific
sectors, as well as why they are brought into these regulatory networks. In the next
section of this article, the development of the role of private actors in NIS will be further
explored, highlighting the European Commission’s developing of NIS policy. In partic-
ular, it will demonstrate the shifting perception of the private sector from being potential
victims of cyber-attacks, to commercial actors bearing responsibility for the adoption of
regulatory standards for system resilience, identified by a regulatory agency.
NIS stages 1, 2 and 3: private actors as objects of regulation, as regulation
adopters, and as regulation shapers
Dedicated European Commission efforts in the field of cyber-security and NIS can be
traced at least as far back as the 2001 initiative, ‘NIS: Proposal for A European Policy
Approach’, which discussed the protection of networks and information systems in
security terms [39]. Prior to 2001, States were presented as being responsible both for
implementing Network and Information Security legislation and for combating
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criminal activities affecting NIS. Although the private sector was starting to be present
in the area, a considerable part of the services was still provided by the public sector.
The 2001 Communication, however, marks an important turning point in the division
of labour between the public sector and businesses, as it finds a new role for the private
sector, more characteristic of the ‘regulatory capitalism’ model.
Stage 1: the emergence of EU cyber-security and the emphasis upon the private
sector
In the 2001 Communication, the Commission states that Bsecurity is becoming a key
priority because communication and information have become a key factor in econom-
ic and societal development^ (2001, p. 2). NIS, for the purposes of this Communica-
tion, was considered as constituting Bthe ability of a network or an information system
to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or malicious actions^ (2001,
p. 3). Such actions include the interception of communications data, unauthorised
access into a computer system for the purposes of copying, modifying or destroying
information, disruptive attacks such as Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS)
and the spreading of malware or other forms of virus ([39], pp. 3–4). While, prior to the
2001 initiative, there had been indirect EU concerns over illicit activities taking place
online, they were not necessarily conceptualised in terms of ‘security’ of systems
themselves, but instead in terms of combatting ‘cybercrime’ (see for example [40]).
Furthermore, emphasis was placed upon the types of data that may be subject to
unauthorised access or use, such as personal or private data [41], resulting in Directive
1995/46/EC on the Protection of Personal Data, and copyrighted works available on the
Internet [42], and in Directive 2001/29/EC on Copyright in the Information Society. At
the same time, at the international level, states concluded the Council of Europe’s
Convention on Cybercrime, intended to facilitate a common approach to computer-
based crimes such as the illegal access or interception of data, data interference, systems
interference and content related offences such as the distribution of materials depicting
child abuse, or intellectual property infringements ([43]; see also [44]). Again, however,
this Convention focused on the combatting of criminal acts and on the requirement of
criminal sanctions, rather than focusing upon attacks on information systems in terms
of security and resilience. In this respect, early initiatives in this field view the private
sector as largely being the victims of such attacks, rather than having a responsibility to
anticipate and resist such attacks. Whereas previously, telecommunications networks
were operated by the public sector, a liberalised, decentralised market open to compe-
tition resulted in Bmany private operators and service providers [acting…] increasingly
on a European and global level^ ([39], p. 2). This, the Commission acknowledged,
made the regulation of this sector somewhat complex (2001, p. 2), and dependent upon
cooperation between undertakings (2001, p. 19). While the State was continuing to do
the ‘steering’, the ‘rowing’ of service provision was being conducted by the private
sector; what was needed was regulatory oversight.
Stage 2- from passive to active actors responsible for adopting regulation
In order to facilitate this oversight, the EU established the European Union Agency for
Network and Information Security (ENISA) through Regulation No 460/2004 in 2004.
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Becoming operational in 2005, ENISA was initially given a mandate to Bassist the
Commission and the Member States, and in consequence cooperate with the business
community, in order to help them meet the requirements of NIS^ (Regulation No 460/
2004, Article 1(2)). Through this framing in the Regulation, it becomes clear that the
Commission views the private sector operators not only as the target for potential
cyber-attacks, but in fact as an active stakeholder that should form part of the regulatory
structure. Recital 3 of the ENISA Regulation, for example, makes reference to Bthe
huge number of private and public actors that bear their own responsibility .^ However,
it would also appear from the Regulation that the role of private sector actors is
predominantly that of passive recipients of information intended to improve their NIS
policies; Article 3(c) refers to the role of ENISA in enhancing cooperation between
different actors cooperating in NIS through organising consultations with industry and
establishing working groups for private sector and consumer bodies. While Recital 24
makes reference to receiving input and expertise from the private sector, the emphasis
in Article 3 is upon the use of private sector actors to adopt and diffuse NIS policies,
akin to the traditional regulatory capitalism approach.
Stage 3- the development of a multi-stakeholder governance model:
from regulation adopters to regulation shapers?
In 2006, the Commission began to lay down the foundations for a larger mandate for
ENISA and further legislation in the field of NIS with its Communication ‘A Strategy
for a Secure Information Society’ [45]. The document stated that Bthe availability,
reliability and security of networks and information systems are increasingly central to
our economies and to the fabric of society^ (2006, p. 3). NIS as currently understood by
the Commission expands upon the 2001 Communication definition, while reiterating
the emphasis on resilience. NIS is, according to this Communication,
[T]he ability of a network or an information system to resist, at a given level of
confidence, accidental events or malicious actions that compromise the availability,
authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted data and the
related services offered by or accessible via these networks and systems ([45], p. 3).
As will be demonstrated through discussion of later Commission initiatives, the need
to protect the Internet is hereafter closely associated with issues of growth and
economic development as specific security issues; as the Commission states, BICT is
a critical component of innovation and is responsible for nearly 40% of productivity
growth […] According to Eurostat, 89% of EU enterprises actively used the Internet in
2004^ as did approximately 50 % of EU consumers (2006, p. 5), numbers that had
increased by 2013 to 90 % [46] and 81 % respectively [47]. Given the near-ubiquitous
use of information systems by both enterprise and individuals, a breach of NIS can
result in severe consequences beyond the purely economic, with potential repercussions
for other forms of critical infrastructure, such as loss of energy supplies or failure of
transport networks (2006, p. 5). Indeed, as Knowles et al. indicate, corporate networks
and the Internet increasingly form part of industrial control systems, presenting poten-
tial risks to physical industrial systems through the misuse or attack of computer
systems [48]. However, and of direct relevance to this paper, the 2006 Commission
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Communication proposes a strategy for ensuring NIS that goes beyond the initial
discussions in the 2001 Communication and the previously limited role of the
private sector under the 2004 ENISA Regulation, through direct interaction and
engagement with private stakeholders, based on Bdialogue, partnership and
empowerment^ (2006, p. 6). The Commission views the roles of private and
public sectors regarding NIS as complementary, necessitating policies based on
multi-stakeholder dialogue (2006, p. 6), facilitating the private sector actors as
regulation shapers, rather than ‘mere’ regulation adopters or diffusers. This would
reflect the proposed ‘networked regulatory capitalism’ phase of Regulatory
Capitalism, in which ‘steering’ is conducted through the cooperation of state,
agency and private sector in determining the content of regulation. In this phase,
the private sector does not only act as an adopter of regulation, but can also be
actively involved in shaping policy responses and the resulting regulation.
In the case of NIS, the effective methods of ensuring the resilience of information
systems are considered by the Commission to be through benchmarking of national
NIS policies, the identification of best practices, and stakeholder debates on how to use
existing regulatory instruments, as well as ensuring private actors work with ENISA to
collect data on cyber-security incidents (2006, p. 8). Finally, the Commission invited
private sector firms to Bdevelop an appropriate definition of responsibilities for software
producers and Internet service providers in relation to the provision of adequate and
auditable levels of security^ (2006, p. 9), leaving the choice of policy definition to these
private actors, as well as the choice of whether to engage with this process. This would
appear to indicate a shift of the private sector from a victim of cyber-attacks to be
protected by national legislation, to a self-regulator with an imposed duty to ensure that
it responds effectively to ENISA-identified security threats, and thereafter to an active
participant in shaping regulations applicable to NIS. This last shift will be discussed
further in the next section.
The telecoms package as a stage 3 case study
The formalisation of the role of private sector actors as one of being actively involved
in shaping NIS resilience standards beyond engagement with ENISA, rather than
‘merely’ adopting and diffusing such standards begins with the passing of Directive
2009/140/EC in November 2009, known as the ‘Telecoms Package’ (see for example
[49]). While previous legislative initiatives, as discussed in the preceding section,
focused upon the criminalisation of attacks on information systems, with the Telecoms
Package comes both a requirement of system resilience, as well as an active role in
regulatory standard-setting. This again demonstrates the usefulness of extending the
regulatory capitalism framework from its focus on ‘state’ (the EU) and ‘agency’
(ENISA) to include ‘business’ (private sector ISPs). While a substantial body of the
academic discussion on the Telecoms Package has been dedicated to the politics of
intellectual property law-making ([49–51] for example), comparatively little attention
has been paid to the impact upon NIS. Directive 2009/140/EC (amongst other things)
amends Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic
communications networks and services, inserting two new Articles on the security
and integrity of networks and services. Article 13a requires in particular that Member
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States ensure that Bundertakings providing public communications networks or pub-
licly available electronic communications services take appropriate technical and
organisational measures to appropriately manage the risks posed to security of net-
works and services^. Furthermore, under subsection 3, Member States should also
ensure that Bundertakings providing public communications networks or publicly
available electronic communications services notify the competent national regulatory
authority of a breach of security or loss of integrity that has had a significant impact on
the operation of networks or services^.2
While Article 13a is addressed to Member States and National Regulatory Author-
ities (NRAs), giving the appearance that private stakeholders such as ISPs play no role
in dictating the terms of regulation or shaping policy in this area, their actual position is
not so clear cut. In a Communication on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection
(CIIP) published in March 2009, approximately six months before the adoption of the
Telecoms Package, the Commission referred to the new regulatory regime as including
Bnew provisions on security and integrity, in particular to strengthen operators’
obligations to ensure that appropriate measures are taken to meet identified risks,
guarantee the continuity of supply of services and notify security breaches^
([56], p. 3). Reiterating the need to ensure NIS due to the social and economic
importance of computer networks for business and individuals and the potential impact
of cyber-attacks ([56], p. 4), the Commission admitted the governance problems arising
from the need to protect CIIs. While Member States are considered as retaining the
ultimate responsibility for defining CII-related policies, Btheir implementation depends
on the involvement of the private sector, which owns or controls a large number of
CIIs^ ([56], p. 5). The Commission expressed hope that a multi-stakeholder governance
model, facilitated by ENISA, could Bfoster the involvement of the private sector in the
definition of strategic public policy objectives as well as operational priorities and
measures^ ([56], p. 6), linking national policy-making to operational expertise, and
putting the private sector at the centre of the regulatory process, ‘steering’ as well as
‘rowing’. The role of ENISA as facilitator is highlighted in the preamble to Directive
2009/140/EC, where it is stated at recital 44 that ENISA Bshould contribute to the
enhanced level of security of electronic communications by, among other things,
providing expertise and advice, and promoting the exchange of best practices^. ENISA,
in order to contribute toward these new policy approaches, was newly empowered
under Regulation No 526/2013 to actively engage in the development of policies
concerning NIS under Article 2(2), in addition to its coordinating and consultative
roles. These policies were to be designed through analysing publicly available NIS
2 The basis for this obligation can be found in the Communication on Electronic Communications Regulation
[52], in which the Commission states that NIS is gaining in importance, and greater efforts to counter security
threats were needed Bgiven the significant social and economic impact of illicit activities in this area^ ([52], p.
18). In order to achieve the goal of improving the resilience of computer systems, the Commission concluded
that Bclose cooperation between enforcement authorities, network operators and ISPs at national level is also
needed^ ([53], p. 71), which would be tackled through amendment of the existing telecommunications
regulations. The original Directive 2002/21/EC made no mention of network or information security, and
neither did the Commission Communication upon which the Directive was based [54]. The decision by the
Commission to impose such obligations upon ISPs appears instead to have its origins in the above-stated 2006
Communication, as mentioned explicitly in the Proposal for the Telecoms Package, which states that the NIS-
related amendments to Directive 2002/21/EC are Bdesigned to strengthen the resilience of current electronic
communications networks and systems^ ([55], p. 3).
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strategies and promoting their publication, as well as identifying best practices in
industry, as indicated in Article 3. To achieve this facilitation of coordinated policy
action and identification of best practices, ENISA has set up the Article 13a Expert
Group, comprising representatives from the NRAs, as well as Bexperts working in the
electronic communications sector via ENISA’s electronic communications reference
group^ ([57], p. ii). This electronic communications reference group has met three
times so far, the first time in Rome in 2013, and most recently in Lisbon in January
2015. While ENISA does not provide a list of members of the reference group, it does
nevertheless state that it comprises experts from the national telecoms providers
(including mobile and Internet Service providers) [58, 59]. Working through a multi-
stakeholder process, ENISA, the NRAs and telecoms providers have developed a
single harmonised framework for the interpretation of Article 13a, intended as Ba tool
for authorities supervising the electronic communications sector, to be used as a
structure for creating guidance or recommendations for providers^ ([57], p. iv). Yet
what are these standards based on? Are they ‘top-down’ standards imposed by NRAs
and ENISA? It would appear that the answer to this question is ‘no’. Referring back to
the 2009 Communication on CIIP, it is understood by the European Union institutions
and ENISA that private sector involvement is essential to the creation of a well-
functioning NIS regime. As a document published by ENISA in 2012 demonstrates,
the standards applied to ensuring information security and integrity are based heavily
upon a set of twenty industry standards in use in the EU telecommunications market
(2012, p. 4), including ISO 27001 on the governance of information security, used by
all respondents to ENISA’s surveys and interviews ([60], p. 5). In response to the
interview question asking what standard should be used for an EU-wide information
security good practice requirement, all respondents answered that it should be based
upon the ISO 27001 standard (2012, p. 14). Through the identification of standards of
best practice, as well as the perceived position of experts in the field of telecoms,
although the Commission has imposed binding legislation upon them, they have
nevertheless been able to influence the standards by which the legislation is applied
and interpreted by feeding into the multi-stakeholder process. It is likely that the private
sector will be as actively involved in such activities in the future; according to ENISA’s
2016 Work Programme, it is stated that ENISAwill continue to work with NRAs and
the private sector to Banalyse the national reports […and] identify new trends and
develop good practices and lessons learned^ ([61], p. 30). Furthermore, ENISA states
that it will work with the private sector (in addition to the public sector) to both develop
and disseminate recommendations, good practices and new initiatives (2015b, p. 31). In
this way, private industry is able to shape both the current NIS policies developed by
and applied throughout the EU, as well as being well placed to contribute to their
development in the future.
An expansion of the 3rd stage? The current trend towards a more
comprehensive role for a larger number of private sector actors in critical
information infrastructures
As discussed, the above security and incidence reporting requirements were imposed
upon telecoms operators solely, including ISPs. However, as the use of web-based
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services such as online document storage, social media tools and databases has become
more widespread, so too has the understanding amongst EU institutions that these online
service providers could also constitute CII, not only the ISPs acting as access providers,
and should therefore also ensure NIS through resilience to attack. Through this, we see
that the Commission’s approach to regulation in this field is to draw a larger range and
number of private sector stakeholders into this regulatory sphere, based on perceptions
of industry know-how, and allowing for these actors to actively ‘steer’ regulatory
standards. In December 2009, just one month after the passing of the Telecoms Package,
the Council passed a Resolution reiterating the growing importance of NIS, as well as
the importance of collaboration between the private sector and governments. In the
Resolution, the Council stated that the multi-stakeholder approach is important in
mitigating Bidentified risks where such an approach delivers added value in helping to
ensure a high level of network resilience^ ([62], sec. IV(7)) and reiterated the Bvital role
providers play in providing robust and resilient electronic communication infrastruc-
tures to society^ (2009, sec. IV(8)). The document proposed the expanding of ENISA’s
mandate, as well the facilitating of a larger role for the private sectors in NIS protection
(2009, sec. VII(6)). Interestingly, the private sector is invited to Bcontinue to work on
standardisation of NIS to strive to find harmonised and interoperable solutions^ (2009,
sec. IX(4)), indicating that the Council perceives the expertise held by private sector
actors in their fields of activity to be an efficient and effective means of regulating NIS,
reinforcing the position of these private actors as policy-shapers, albeit indirectly
through the setting of standards rather than directly influencing legislation.
Cyber-security and NIS forms part of the EU’s Digital Agenda, which is part of the
Europe 2020 initiative. Europe 2020, shaped by concerns over the significant impact of
the Global Financial Crisis upon EU economic growth and stability ([63], p. 6; see also
[64]), proposed a number of initiatives intended to restore the EU to economic strength
(2010b, p. 8). The 2010 Digital Agenda Communication stated with regard to cyber-
security that the Bcooperation of relevant actors needs to be organised at global level to
be effectively able to fight and mitigate security threats^ ([4], p. 17). The Commission
stated it would pursue a renewed and reinforced NIS policy, and would Bfoster multi-
stakeholder dialogue and self-regulation of European and global service providers (e.g.
social networking platforms, mobile communications providers)^ (2010a, pp. 17–18),
indicating both that the understanding that private sector actors are best-placed to tackle
security threats, allowing for them to be involved in the shaping of cyber-security
responses, as well as expanding the focus of NIS efforts from telecoms (i.e. access
providers) to online service providers. Pillar III of the Digital Agenda Strategy, named
‘Trust and Security’ provides a series of actions for the European Commission to
undertake, including Action 28: A Reinforced Network and Information Security
Policy. This Action included the extending of ENISA’s mandate and position as the
‘fulcrum’ for EU expertise and information exchange, as well as serving as the basis for
an additional Action Point 123: a proposed Directive on NIS [65].
The proposed NIS Directive was preceded by the Cyber-security Strategy of the
European Union published in February 2013, in which it was again affirmed that cyber-
security is seen as a multi-stakeholder effort with a significant role for the private sector
([66], p. 4). In the legislation as proposed, the European Parliament et al. state that the
involvement of the private sector in both facilitating resilience in NIS, as well as
defining the standards for NIS, is essential. The proposal was intended to:
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Improve preparedness and engagement of the private sector. Since the large
majority of network and information systems are privately owned and operated,
improving engagement with the private sector to foster cybersecurity is crucial.
The private sector should develop, at technical level, its own cyber resilience
capacities and share best practices across sectors. (2013, p. 6)
The Commission subsequently released an Impact Assessment, creating Ba strong
incentive [for public administrators and private actors] to manage and dimension
security risks effectively^ by imposing a regulatory regime facilitating private
stakeholder involvement (67, p. 6). The resulting Proposal indicated that upon
consultation with the private sector, as with the Telecoms Package security amend-
ments, standard setting for resilience would be best based upon industry standards,
placing the private sector not only in the ‘steering’ category of the networked regulatory
capitalism phase, but at its helm. Recital 32 of the proposed Directive states that the
Bstandardisation of security requirements is a market-driven process. To ensure a
convergent application of security standards, Member States should encourage
compliance or conformity with specified standards to ensure a high level of security
at Union level^. The relevant private actors, according to the Proposal, are information
society providers as defined by Directives 98/34/EC Article 1(2) and 2000/31/EC
Article 2(a), namely Bany service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance,
by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services^, which
would cover all Internet services such as Google, Facebook or Twitter, but not the ISPs
themselves, as they are already covered by the amendments made to the above-
discussed Directive 2002/21/EC (as stated in the proposed Directive Article 1(3).
Article 14(1) states that Member States should Bensure that public administrations
and market operators take appropriate technical and organisational measures to manage
the risks posed to the security of the networks and information systems which they
control and use in their operations^, with Article 16(1) stating that Member States
should Bencourage the use of standards and/or specifications relevant to networks and
information security .^ These standards would presumably be those used by private
actors providing online services.
Indeed, this would appear to be the view of the Commission; in a ‘Frequently Asked
Questions’ document released pertaining to the proposed Directive, the Commission
stated that it did not see itself as a standard setting body, instead providing a minimal
legislative requirement that would facilitate ENISA to Bwork with standardisation
bodies and all relevant stakeholders to develop technical guidelines and recommenda-
tions for the adoption of NIS benchmarks and good practices^ [68]. On this basis, a
High Level Conference held by the Commission took place on 28 May 2015, with over
200 public and private sector representatives, including representatives from service
providers such as Blackberry, Amazon, IBM, Microsoft and Symantec. The purpose
was Bexploring the way forward regarding the Commission proposal for a Directive
laying down measures to ensure a high level of NIS across the Union^ [69]. At the time
of writing, while the Directive has not yet been formally adopted, there has nevertheless
been political agreement between the European Parliament and Council [70] on the
Commission’s proposal, achieved through an informal trilogue in December 2015 [71].
What is particularly interesting is the way in which the Directive has been revised in
trilogue to further establish the role of private sector actors in protecting NIS. While not
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legally binding, some of the recitals indicate a clear intent for the regulation of NIS to
incorporate the private sector; reiterating that Bcooperation between the private and
public sector is essential^, the Directive specifies that informal cooperation should be
encouraged between market operators so as to ensure NIS at Recital 34. Furthermore,
ENISA is regarded as having an essential role in disseminating best practices and
expertise (Recital 35), and is also specifically tasked with providing advice and
guidelines to Member States regarding market-driven standards (Recital 66). The
revised Directive provides more concrete definitions of the relevant private actors in
Article 3, which as well as including operators of essential services such as airlines (a
list of essential services being included in Annex II appended to the Directive), states
that it applies to ‘digital service providers’ (Article 3(11da)), including operators of
online marketplaces (Article 3(11e)), online search engines (Article 3(11 g)) and cloud
computing services (Article 3(11j)). Again, highlighting the nature of NIS as a sector in
which regulatory networks comprising public and private actors are deemed most
effective, Article 8a establishes a Cooperation Group, comprising representatives of
the Commission, ENISA and the Member States, which may Binvite representatives
from the relevant stakeholders to participate in its work^. The relevant work, as
indicated in Article 8(3), is to include establishing work programmes, as well as
exchanging best practices on incident notification, capacity building, training, and
research and development, as well as identifying best practices in national NIS
practices and policies through periodic evaluations. The role of private actors is
significant; whereas Article 14(1) is largely untouched in the revision to the Directive,
Article 16(1) on standards is significantly modified, stating that Member States should
Bencourage the use of European or internationally accepted standards and/or
specifications^ for NIS, and adding a clause that BENISA shall elaborate advice and
guidelines regarding the technical areas which should be considered in relation to
paragraph 1 as well as regarding already existing standards^. These standards, as
discussed above, constitute those best practices established by existing private actors
in these fields. ENISA, as indicated in its 2016 Work Programme, foresees itself as
having a guiding and coordinating role in the implementation of the Directive,
stating that BENISA will leverage its existing knowledge and expertise in stakeholder
engagement with the public and/or private sector^ (2015b, p. 35). The Work
Programme refers to ENISA’s previous successes in achieving this with regard to
other sectors such as the establishment of minimum security measures for smart
grids, and that through engagement its existing working groups, can quickly and
effectively identify relevant sectoral actors, engage with them on identifying best
practices and, subsequently, how best to implement them (2015b, p. 35). This
ultimately means that, as with the amendments produced as a result of the Telecoms
Package, while private sector actors may not necessarily be dictating the wording of
the legislation per se, they will nevertheless be able to shape the regulatory
approaches dictated by legislation through the use of their industries’ standards and
best practices, as well as the way in which they will be implemented. The develop-
ment of the NIS Directive demonstrates that the expansion of role witnessed in the
Telecoms Package is not an unusual development in this field, but in fact was the
first step in the development of a more holistic approach to NIS protection, incor-
porating a wider body of private sector actors in the identification and dissemination
of industry best practices as regulatory tools
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Conclusion
This article has sought to provide a case study in how private actors who are not
considered security actors have nevertheless been incorporated into security-related
regulatory structures, based on the knowledge and expertise they are perceived to possess.
On the basis of the Regulatory Capitalism and Network Governance frameworks, the
article has sought to provide a better understanding not only of how these private actors
become involved in security governance, but also of why they are brought into the
regulatory structure not only as policy adopters, but also as policy shapers. On the basis
of the proposed theoretical framework, the article develops a 3 stage analysis that explores
the evolution of the private sector in NIS from objects of regulation, to regulation adopters
and, at a later stage, to regulation shapers. This adds to the existing Regulatory Capitalism
framework by demonstrating the ways in which private actors can take on an active
‘steering’ function in regulation by the shaping of regulatory responses, rather than amore
passive role of adopting or diffusing regulation (i.e. ‘rowing’). The understanding that
Internet service providers have technical knowledge and expertise not possessed by the
State or regulatory agencies has resulted in technical standards developed by private
industry actors being adopted as resilience standards for NIS by bodies such as ENISA;
furthermore, through active engagement in working groups and expert committees, these
industry actors are able to shape regulatory responses through the coordinated and
cooperative identification of best practices that serve as the basis for the EU’s resilience
strategies. Current developments in this field indicate that this trend is likely to continue, if
not accelerate, particularly in areas of technological complexity. The private sector may
not serve only to steer the ship; instead, it may determine its ultimate destination.
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